The war in Yemen and the Houthi movement: origins, actors and outlook

Key findings

Evidence cutoff: 13 September 2026 · Forecast horizon: 30 September 2027

Bottom line. After four years of relative calm, the war in Yemen entered a new, more dangerous phase in September 2026. The Houthis captured the port of Mokha (as confirmed by the UN envoy) and, according to government representatives, also the rest of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, together with the islands near the Bab al-Mandab Strait. They are attacking Saudi Arabia and shipping linked to it, while government forces, with Saudi air support, are counterattacking. The conflict grew out of domestic political, identity-related and economic grievances, but its current dynamics are largely determined by the war of the United States and Israel with Iran (moderate confidence). Of the four scenarios for the coming year, a protracted limited conflict is the most likely (low confidence).

• Origins. The Houthi movement grew out of a Zaydi revival in the marginalized north. Six wars with the Saleh government (2004–2010), the breakdown of the transition after 2011 and the dispute over dividing the country into regions led to the seizure of Sanaa (September 2014) and the intervention of a Saudi-led coalition (March 2015) (S003; S013; S028).
• Costs. A UNDP model estimated 377,000 deaths by the end of 2021, nearly 60% of them indirect (S020). In 2026, more than 22 million people need assistance, and in August the UN appeal was about 20% funded (S124; S117).
• Internationalization. From November 2023 the Houthis attacked shipping and Israel; US and Israeli strikes weakened their capabilities but did not destroy them (S031; S056; S110).
• 2026. In January, Saudi Arabia crushed the separatists of the Southern Transitional Council and became the main sponsor of the government camp. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz made Bab al-Mandab the main route for Saudi oil. A dispute over flights from Tehran to Sanaa in July opened a Saudi–Houthi confrontation, and the Houthi offensive in September took the west coast from the government (S089; S077; S119; S115; S182).
• Iran and the major powers. The Houthis are an autonomous ally of Iran, heavily dependent on Iranian technology and increasingly closely coordinated with it, rather than a proxy carrying out orders (moderate confidence) (S031; S041; S107; S154). Saudi Arabia is avoiding a full-scale war, the US position is ambiguous, and Russia and China are holding back a tougher course in the Security Council (S135; S154; S156; S119).

Basis and scope. An intelligence assessment based on 182 retrieved documents (including from the UN, the US Congressional Research Service, International Crisis Group, the Sana’a Center, Human Rights Watch, and news agency wire reports), with claims recorded in a register with locators. Evidence cutoff: 13 September 2026; forecast horizon: 30 September 2027. The course of the fighting is known mainly from the parties’ own accounts.

Uncertainty and implications. Scenarios for 12 months: protracted limited war about 40%, new freeze about 25%, regional war in Yemen about 25%, military breakthrough about 10%. The Houthis will very likely hold Sanaa (about 90%). The key variables are the US–Iran confrontation and Riyadh’s decisions. Indicators: talks on Hormuz, the scale of Saudi air strikes, attacks on ships not linked to Saudi Arabia, and the frontlines in Marib, Taiz and around Aden.

Method and status. This assessment distinguishes sourced facts, statements attributed to the parties, and its own judgments and forecasts, which carry probability and confidence levels. It was researched and drafted in Polish and translated into English with AI assistance; before publication every sentence with a source reference was checked against stored copies of the sources. The publisher approved this edition on 15 September 2026. No independent human fact-check, translator review or specialist review has taken place.

1. Scope, method and how to read this report

Question. Where the conflict in Yemen involving the Houthi movement came from, what drives it, who its actors are and what they seek, what its situation is on 13 September 2026 and what explains that situation, and how various parties and analytical centers assess its further course.

Scope. Yemen since the 1962 revolution, with an emphasis on the years 2004–2026; the Houthi movement (officially Ansar Allah, “Supporters of God”); the government camp and the southern forces; the states of the region (Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates — hereafter UAE, Oman, Israel, Egypt) and global powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Russia, China), as well as the United Nations (UN). Humanitarian and economic issues are discussed to the extent needed to understand the conflict.

Method. The report is based on 214 registered sources, of which 182 were retrieved and stored locally with a checksum. Factual claims were written on the basis of quotations from these documents, with a locator (page, paragraph or heading). Sources of first choice were UN documents (Security Council resolutions, UN Panel of Experts reports, statements by the UN Special Envoy), texts of agreements, government documents (including US documents) and reports by organizations with a transparent method (Human Rights Watch; ACLED — an organization that collects data on incidents of political violence; International Crisis Group; Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies; Security Council Report — an independent organization that tracks the work of the UN Security Council, hereafter SCR; the US Congressional Research Service — CRS). Events of July–September 2026 are described mainly on the basis of statements by the UN and news agencies (AP, AFP, Reuters) and by outlets with differing perspectives (Al Jazeera, The Guardian, Arab News, Tehran Times, the Houthi news agency Saba). Statements by the parties to the conflict are always presented as attributed statements, not as findings.

How to distinguish types of statements. Facts carry a source reference in parentheses, e.g. (S003, p. 163); the page number refers to the page of the PDF file, which may differ from the page number printed in the document. Statements by the parties are marked with the name of the party (“according to the Houthis”, “according to the government”). This assessment’s own judgments and forecasts are described as judgments, with a confidence level. Quotations from English-language sources are given in their original wording; quotations from sources in other languages are translated and marked as own translations.

Probability scale (taken from the US intelligence directive ICD 203): almost no chance 1–5%; very unlikely 5–20%; unlikely 20–45%; roughly even chance 45–55%; likely 55–80%; very likely 80–95%; almost certain 95–99%.

The confidence level of a judgment (high, moderate, low) describes the quality of the evidence base, not the probability of the event. A judgment held with moderate confidence may concern a very likely event, and vice versa.

Most important limitation. The situation changed from day to day in the week preceding the evidence cutoff. Information on the course of the fighting comes largely from the parties to the conflict and was often not independently verified — as the cited outlets themselves point out. Some sources (including original Reuters wire reports, analyses by Chatham House and Israel’s INSS, and the latest data from the IPC — the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, an international five-phase scale of the severity of hunger) were unavailable for automated retrieval; they were not cited as having been read.

2. Yemen at a glance

Yemen lies at the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, on the Bab al-Mandab Strait, one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes (S111, p. 1), which links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden (S115). In 2024, an average of about 4.1 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the strait each day, or about 5% of the global volume (according to Al Jazeera, S077; Rzeczpospolita gives 12% of oil, without indicating the data source, for the period before the war with Iran — S214). The country was the poorest state in the Arab world even before the war (S111, p. 1); according to an October 2025 estimate by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as cited by CRS, gross domestic product (GDP) in 2025 was about USD 17.35 billion and GDP per capita about USD 401; real GDP contracted by 27% between 2014 and 2024 (S110).

Today’s Republic of Yemen was established on 22 May 1990 through the merger of the northern Yemen Arab Republic, with its capital in Sanaa, and the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, with its capital in Aden — a former British colony and later a state with a Marxist system (S015; S111, p. 1). The north–south divide has recurred in Yemeni politics since the 1960s (S111, p. 1).

The most important internal divisions overlap: regional (north and south), religious, tribal and political. The northern highlands are inhabited largely by Zaydis, that is, followers of a distinct branch of Shia Islam, while parts of the center-north and the entire south are traditionally Shafi’i Sunni (S003, p. 52); according to a 2020 US estimate, Sunnis make up about 65% and Shias about 35% of the population (S110). Tribal and local forces remain the most important real authority in many regions (S111, p. 1).

In 2026 the country is in effect divided. The Houthis control the capital, Sanaa, and a large part of the west of the country, where the majority of the population lives (S110). The internationally recognized government, led by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), exercises nominal authority over the remaining areas; its provisional capital is Aden, and some government leaders and PLC members are based in Riyadh (S110). In parallel, there are two central banks and two currency circuits — in Aden and in Sanaa (S081; S139).

3. Background: from the imamate to the collapse of the transition (to 2015)

3.1. Zaydism, the imamate and the 1962 revolution

Zaydism emerged in the 8th century among Muslims who held that Ali should have become Muhammad’s successor. Zaydis recognized as the fifth imam Zayd bin Ali, who was killed in 740 during an uprising against the Umayyads, hence the term “Fivers” (S003, p. 94). The first Zaydi state in Yemen was established in 893; successive Zaydi imamates survived — with interruptions — until 1962 (S003, p. 95). Zaydism differs significantly from Twelver Shiism, which is dominant in Iran: Zaydis are not subject to a clerical hierarchy, and most of them do not support the Iranian doctrine of rule of the jurisconsult (wilayat al-faqih) (S003, p. 97). This difference matters when assessing the Houthis’ relations with Tehran (section 8.4).

The revolution of 26 September 1962 (S005) ended the imamate, under which Zaydi Hashemites — a lineage that regards itself as descended from the Prophet — had ruled for more than a thousand years (S002). The revolution was followed by an eight-year civil war (1962–1970), which was also a proxy war between the region’s powers: President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt supported the republicans with money, weapons and troops, while Saudi Arabia — fearing the overthrow of the monarchy on its southern border by Nasserist forces — supported the royalists and the tribes fighting on their side; in the background, the Soviet Union financed Egypt and the United States financed Saudi Arabia (S212). The war tied down 60,000 Egyptian troops during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and became known as “Egypt’s Vietnam” (S212). The deposed imam Muhammad al-Badr relied on the Zaydi tribes of the north (S213). This precedent — Saudi Arabia and a rival regional power on opposite sides of a Yemeni civil war — recurs in the current conflict. Crisis Group lists the decline of the Hashemite stratum after the revolution, the lack of investment in Zaydi strongholds such as Saada and the failure to manage religious pluralism as roots of the later conflict in Saada (S002, p. 3; S001).

3.2. Two states, unification and the 1994 war

After unification in 1990, tensions between the elites of the north and the south grew rapidly. In May 1994 a brief civil war broke out, fought mainly in the south (S003) — the north suppressed the south’s attempt at secession by force (S088). Southerners, as RAND notes, perceived the north’s entry as a form of colonialism (S003). This experience later gave rise to the Southern Movement (al-Hirak); in 2009 Human Rights Watch documented hundreds of arbitrary arrests and the use of live ammunition against peaceful demonstrators in the south (S014). In 2017 the Southern Transitional Council (STC) was established as an umbrella for groups seeking to restore an independent southern state within the pre-1990 borders (S068).

3.3. Ali Abdullah Saleh’s system of rule

Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled North Yemen, and subsequently unified Yemen, until 2012. His power rested largely on ties to the Hashid tribal confederation and on the selective co-optation or punishment of kin groups (S003, p. 94). According to RAND, this neopatrimonial model — in which access to the state depends on personal loyalty — fostered the marginalization of the Zaydi heartland in the north (S003, p. 34).

3.4. The emergence of the Houthi movement

The modern Houthis grew out of the Zaydi revival. As early as 1990, Hashemite notables founded the al-Haqq party as an expression of Zaydi interests in the face of unification and the spread of Wahhabism (S003, p. 36). The revival was to a large extent a reaction to the influx of Salafism — a current of Sunni Islam calling for a return to the practices of the first generations of Muslims — in a form inspired by Saudi Wahhabism: it was spread by, among others, Yemenis returning from work in the Gulf, and after 1990 part of the Islah party supported it (S003, p. 35). In this milieu a network known as the Believing Youth (al-Shabab al-Mu’min) emerged, whose founders included the sons of the cleric Badreddin al-Houthi (S003, p. 36).

The most influential of them was Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, a former member of parliament (S002, p. 7). His movement adopted the slogan: “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam” (S003, p. 23; S040). It was first chanted collectively on 17 January 2002 at the Imam Hadi school in the Marran mountains (S003, p. 149). RAND points out that the immediate background to the radicalization was the period after 11 September 2001, when the Saleh government tightened its cooperation with the US (S003, pp. 18, 37). RAND interprets Hussein’s references to Iran and Hezbollah as an affirmation of their anti-American stance rather than the adoption of a religious ideology from outside Zaydism (S003, p. 151).

3.5. Six wars in Saada (2004–2010)

In June 2004 the government attempted to arrest Hussein al-Houthi in his stronghold in Haydan district in Saada province; fighting broke out, and on 10 September 2004 security forces killed him (S002, p. 7). The conflict did not die down. RAND distinguishes six phases: June–September 2004, March–April 2005, December 2005–February 2006, February 2007–January 2008, May–July 2008, and August 2009–February 2010 (S003, p. 163). Each successive round was more intense than the previous one (S002, p. 7). Qatari mediation led to an agreement in Doha on 2 February 2008, which quickly collapsed (S002, p. 8). Leadership of the movement passed to Hussein’s brother, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who still leads it today (S003, p. 134; S001, p. 11).

Saudi Arabia participated directly in the sixth round, which began on 12 August 2009 (S014): from 4 November 2009 Saudi aircraft and artillery regularly struck Houthi positions near the border, and the deployment of ground forces was reportedly the largest since the 1990–1991 Gulf War (S003, pp. 185–186). Casualty estimates for the Saada wars ranged from several hundred to more than 20,000; the number of displaced people reached 150,000, and about 3,000 people were arrested for supporting the Houthis (S003, p. 17). The government blocked media access and restricted humanitarian aid; after the fifth round of fighting broke out in May 2008, it blocked the movement of all commercial goods, including staple foods and fuel, which according to Human Rights Watch appears to constitute unlawful collective punishment (S004).

The government portrayed the Houthis as a movement seeking to restore the imamate and backed by Iran. In 2009 Crisis Group judged that there was no hard evidence for this and that Iran’s role, although it could not be ruled out, was “not self-evident” (S002, pp. 7, 21). The Houthis themselves did not articulate clear demands at the time; their representatives spoke of defending Zaydi identity, opposing the government’s cooperation with the US, the economic neglect of Saada, and self-defense against military operations (S004). The conflict also generated a war economy: control over the border with Saudi Arabia, arms trading from military depots and competition for these resources perpetuated the fighting (S002, p. 19). According to RAND, the conflict was in essence a combination of local material grievances and identity claims with the governing methods of the central authorities, rather than a local manifestation of the transnational “Shi‘ite Crescent” (S003, pp. 17–18).

3.6. The Arab Spring, the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative and the National Dialogue Conference (2011–2014)

The 2011 uprising against Saleh — Yemen’s chapter of the Arab Spring — changed the Houthis’ position. From a political and military outsider confined to Saada province, they became a participant in the nationwide contest: they joined the protests, established contacts with activists across the country and exploited the weakness of the state to expand their influence in the north (S001, pp. 3, 8). In 2011 they took de facto authority in Saada — appointing a governor, collecting taxes and administering justice (S001).

The transition was negotiated under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Under the GCC initiative and its implementation mechanism, adopted on 23 November 2011, Saleh transferred his powers to Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi; early elections were to be held within 90 days with Hadi as the sole agreed candidate; a government of national unity was to be divided equally between the former ruling camp and the opposition; and the two-year second phase was to include a national dialogue conference with the participation of, among others, youth, the Southern Movement and the Houthis, as well as work on a new constitution (S006, paras. 5–7, 10, 18, 20–22). The Houthis rejected the GCC initiative in principle but took part in the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which brought them national and international legitimacy (S001, p. 8).

The conference met in Sanaa from March 2013 to January 2014 (S005, p. 225). On Saada, it adopted, among other things, the principle of state neutrality toward religious doctrines and a commitment to take from all groups the heavy and medium weapons looted from the state (S005, pp. 17, 19). The decision on the number of regions of the future federal state was referred to a committee appointed and chaired by the president, with options of six or two regions (S005, p. 9). On 10 February 2014 the committee approved a division into six regions: Hadramawt, Saba, Aden, al-Janad, Azal and Tihama (S012, p. 5). According to an analysis published by MERIP (Middle East Research and Information Project), the 22-member committee drew the boundaries in less than two weeks, in breach of NDC rules and without broad consultation (S013). The Houthis argued that the plan deprived the Azal region — which includes their heartland in Saada — of resources and access to the sea by cutting it off from the hydrocarbon-rich province of al-Jawf and coastal Hajjah (S013). Other groups, including the Southern Movement, also raised objections (S013).

At the same time, the Houthis expanded their control by force. From October 2013 they fought Salafis around the Dar al-Hadith institute in Dammaj; by January 2014 the fighting had spread to Amran, Hajjah, al-Jawf and the outskirts of Sanaa, and on 3 February 2014 the Houthis defeated the forces of the al-Ahmar family in its home town of Khamir (S001, pp. 9–10). In June 2014 Crisis Group warned that the Houthis, emboldened by their victories, might “overplay their hand” instead of consolidating their gains through compromise, and that the Hadi government risked being drawn into a conflict it could not win militarily (S001, p. 4). Even then, former President Saleh was widely suspected of supporting the Houthis politically and even militarily, which both sides denied (S001, p. 13).

3.7. The capture of Sanaa and the collapse of the transition (2014–2015)

In September 2014, riding a wave of discontent with the transition and amid a dispute over fuel subsidy reform, the Houthis took military control of Sanaa (S042, p. 78). On the evening of 21 September 2014, representatives of Ansar Allah and the main political forces, including the government, signed the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (S008, introductory note; S013). It provided, among other things, for the appointment of presidential advisers from Ansar Allah and the Southern Movement, a new, neutral prime minister and a competency-based government, the dismantling of armed camps around the capital once a new fuel price had been announced, and — in an annex — the withdrawal of armed groups coming from outside the provinces of Amran, al-Jawf and Marib (S008, arts. 1, 2, 15; annex arts. 4–5). The agreement also contained provisions on mitigating the effects of the fuel subsidy reform for citizens and required the structure of the state to be reconsidered in line with the outcomes of the NDC rather than the decisions of the regions committee (S008; S013).

The dispute soon returned. Even before the draft constitution was published in January 2015, the Houthis again rejected the six-region federal system it set out, and on 17 January 2015 they abducted the director of the president’s office, Ahmad bin Mubarak, who was to deliver the draft; according to MERIP, this set off a chain of provocations that ended with the overthrow of the Hadi government, his flight and the Saudi-led bombing campaign (S013). As early as the capture of Sanaa in September 2014, the Houthis placed President Hadi and Defense Minister Mahmoud al-Subaihi under house arrest (S042, p. 78), and by January 2015 they had forced the government’s resignation (S040). Already after the capture of Sanaa, the Houthis made gestures toward Iran, and in March 2015 flights from Iran to Sanaa were launched; they were ended on 26 March 2015 by an air blockade imposed by the coalition of Gulf states (S042, p. 78). This episode has a direct parallel in July 2026 (section 7.3).

In a letter transmitted to the Security Council on 24 March 2015 by Yemen’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Hadi reported that he had asked the GCC and the Arab League for immediate support “by all necessary means and measures, including military intervention” (S011, preamble). The Saudi-led intervention was announced on 26 March 2015 (S028).

4. Full-scale war and truce (2015–2023)

4.1. Coalition intervention and Resolution 2216

The coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (S021) launched its operation on 26 March 2015 (S028). On 14 April 2015, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2216. In it, the Council demanded that the Houthis immediately and unconditionally end violence, withdraw from all areas they had seized, including Sanaa, relinquish the arms they had taken from the military, including missiles, and refrain from threatening neighboring states; it also imposed an arms embargo on designated individuals, including Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and the former president’s son, Ahmed Ali Saleh (S011, paras. 1, 14, annex). The resolution endorsed the legitimacy of President Hadi but did not authorize the use of armed force; the only authorization concerns the seizure of goods subject to the embargo (S011, para. 16). Resolution 2216 remains a reference point for Saudi Arabia to this day (S118).

The United States provided the coalition with logistical, intelligence and advisory support, but in 2018 it ended aerial refueling of coalition aircraft and curtailed some arms sales to Saudi Arabia in response to civilian casualties and action by Congress (S111). According to the CRS, Houthi attacks beyond Yemen’s borders grew over time in complexity and scope as Iran’s support deepened (S111).

4.2. Collapse of the alliance with Saleh, Hodeidah and the Stockholm Agreement

The Houthis initially fought the war in alliance with former President Saleh — the same man whose forces they had fought in 2004–2010. The alliance ended when Houthi fighters killed Saleh on 4 December 2017 (S042). In April 2018, a coalition airstrike in Hodeidah killed Saleh al-Sammad, president of the Supreme Political Council established by the Houthis; he was succeeded by Mahdi al-Mashat (S040).

In June 2018, coalition-backed forces, with the UAE in the leading role, launched an offensive on Hodeidah — the main port in Houthi-held territory (S042). The offensive was halted by the Stockholm Agreement of 13 December 2018, which comprised an agreement on the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Isa, a prisoner exchange mechanism and a declaration on Taiz (S017). To oversee the Hodeidah component, the Security Council established the UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) by Resolution 2452 of 16 January 2019 (S122); the mission was closed on 31 March 2026 (section 8.3).

4.3. Rifts in the anti-Houthi camp and attacks on Saudi Arabia

The war exposed deep divisions among the Houthis’ opponents. After fighting between government forces and the STC in Aden, Abyan and Shabwa, Saudi Arabia conducted talks from 20 August to 24 October 2019 that resulted in the Riyadh Agreement — which provided, among other things, for a competency-based government with the participation of both sides and the return of the prime minister to Aden (S019). In practice, as Gregory D. Johnsen describes, STC units refused orders from commanders affiliated with the Islah party, while Tareq Saleh’s forces operated independently of both (S088).

On 14 September 2019, Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais were attacked. The Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack; the United States, European states and Saudi Arabia blamed Iran, which denied it. In December 2019, the UN Secretary-General reported that the UN was unable to independently confirm that the missiles and drones used were of Iranian origin (S029). In the same year, the Houthis announced a unilateral halt to attacks on Saudi Arabia — according to Brookings, contrary to the interests of Iran, which wanted to use them for escalation (S041). In January 2022, the Houthis carried out deadly attacks on the UAE (S091).

4.4. Costs of the war

The most frequently cited estimate of the total human cost comes from a 2021 report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), based on a model developed by the Pardee Center at the University of Denver. According to this model, by the end of 2021 the war would have caused 377,000 deaths: 154,000 directly as a result of fighting and violence and 223,000 (nearly 60%) indirectly — due to lack of food, water and health care. Children under the age of five accounted for 259,000 of the dead, or almost 70% (S020, p. 32). Lost GDP was estimated at USD 126 billion, and the number of people pushed into extreme poverty by the war at 15.6 million (S020, pp. 12, 32). The authors stress that these are model estimates subject to considerable uncertainty, not measurements (S020, p. 30). No more recent, comparable estimate covering 2022–2026 was found.

In 2020, the UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen found violations committed by all parties: the government, the Houthis, the STC and members of the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Some coalition airstrikes were carried out without due regard for the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution; indiscriminate attacks were carried out by both the coalition and the Houthis; the Houthis unlawfully used landmines. The Group concluded that some of these acts may constitute war crimes and recommended that the Security Council refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (S021).

4.5. The 2022 truce, the Presidential Leadership Council and Saudi–Houthi talks

On 2 April 2022, a two-month UN-negotiated truce took effect: a halt to offensive ground, air and sea operations, the entry of 18 fuel ships into the ports of Hodeidah, two commercial flights a week to and from Sanaa, and talks on opening roads in Taiz (S023). Five days later, on 7 April 2022, President Hadi dismissed Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and transferred power to an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council, announced in Riyadh. Rashad al-Alimi became its chairman; its members included, among others, Marib Governor Sultan al-Arada, STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi, National Resistance Forces commander Tareq Saleh and Giants Brigades commander Abu Zaraa al-Muharrami (S026). Johnsen describes the PLC as a compromise designed in Saudi Arabia, accepted by the UAE and imposed on Yemen (S088).

The truce formally expired on 2 October 2022, when the parties rejected a proposal to extend it (S024). During the truce period, the number of fatalities from political violence was the lowest since January 2015 (S024), and — as UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg put it — the truce kept the front lines relatively quiet “for four years, and well beyond its formal expiry” (S160). In autumn 2022, however, Houthi attacks on export terminals forced the government to halt oil exports — its main source of foreign-currency revenue (S139; S135). Since then, the government has become increasingly dependent on external support (S135).

In 2023, talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis accelerated after the Beijing-brokered Saudi–Iranian détente. In April 2023, a Saudi delegation made a public visit to Sanaa, and on 14 September 2023 a Houthi delegation arrived in Riyadh — the first such visit since the start of the conflict (S028). Sana’a Center analysts pointed out that the talks were being held over the heads of the PLC, and that, according to leaks about the draft agreement, Riyadh was prepared to “bargain away” the rights and resources of the south, which met with an unyielding position among southerners (S028). On 23 December 2023, Grundberg announced the parties’ commitment to a nationwide ceasefire, payment of public sector salaries, resumption of oil exports, the opening of roads in Taiz and the easing of restrictions on Sanaa airport and the port of Hodeidah; the commitments were to be incorporated into a UN “roadmap” (S022). The roadmap was not implemented. Talks intended to consolidate the truce with Saudi Arabia have been suspended indefinitely (S107), and US sanctions on the Houthis now limit the possibility of Saudi payments for their benefit, e.g., for salaries (S135).

The balance of power is illustrated by the 2024 banking war. On 7 July 2024, the central bank in Aden revoked the licenses of six major banks and ordered them to relocate from Sanaa; the Houthis responded with threats to attack Saudi Arabia. Under Saudi pressure, the government reversed these steps in an agreement reached through UN mediation on 22 July 2024 (S082). According to an analysis by the Arab Gulf States Institute, the agreement de facto strengthened the Houthis by showing that their military capability allows them to neutralize the economic pressure of their opponents (S082).

5. Causes: why the war broke out and why it continues

The Yemeni conflict does not have a single cause. The sources consistently describe it as an overlap of several layers, none of which on its own explains either its outbreak or its persistence.

1. Political exclusion and the model of the state. Saleh’s rule rested on personal loyalty and co-optation, which entrenched the marginalization of the northern highlands (S003, pp. 34, 94). The post-2011 transition was negotiated among elites and under external sponsorship, and the key decision on dividing the country into regions was taken by a narrow committee, without broad consultation (S006; S013). The Houthis read the federal plan as an attempt to cut them off from resources and from the sea (S013).

2. Identity and religion. The Zaydi revival was a reaction to the decline in the status of the Hashemites after 1962 and to the spread of Salafism (S002, p. 3; S003, p. 35). The sectarian dimension is real, but it does not explain the conflict as a “Sunni versus Shia” war: the Houthis fought Saleh’s government in 2004–2010, cooperated with him from 2014, formally allied with him from May 2015 until 2017, and then killed him (S042); their main opponents in the north were the Salafis as well as the al-Ahmar family and the Islah party (S001, pp. 9–10). As early as 2010, RAND assessed that the conflict was not a local manifestation of the “Shi‘ite Crescent” (S003, p. 17).

3. The economy and the war economy. The Saada wars grew out of the region’s lagging development and quickly generated material interests in their continuation — control of the border, the arms trade, resources (S002, p. 19). Today, the competition is over salaries, oil and gas revenues, customs duties, ports and the banking system: the Houthis finance themselves through customs duties, taxes, telecommunications and fuel trading (S031, p. 26), while the government has lost its oil exports (S139). The Houthis’ demands in 2026 — payment of salaries in the areas they control, a share of public revenues, flights from Sanaa and unrestricted operation of the port of Hodeidah — are at once economic and political, because they amount to recognition of their de facto sovereignty (S135).

4. Weakness and fragmentation of the state. The anti-Houthi camp has for years remained divided among formations loyal to different commanders and patrons (S088). Johnsen assessed in 2025 that there is no internal rival in Yemen capable of defeating the Houthis (S088).

5. The external factor. External interventions have accompanied Yemen since the civil war of the 1960s, when Egypt backed the republicans and Saudi Arabia the royalists (S212). In the current conflict, Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in 2009 and 2015, the UAE built its own network of allies in the south, and Iran systematically expanded its support for the Houthis (S003, p. 185; S088; S031, p. 2). Since 2023, the dynamics of the conflict have been increasingly determined by regional wars — in the Gaza Strip and, since February 2026, with Iran (sections 6–7).

Competing explanations. Two simplifications appear most often. The “proxy war” explanation (the Houthis as a tool of Iran) accounts well for the growth of Houthi military capabilities after 2015 and for the current coordination with Tehran, but it does not explain the origins of the movement, the Saada wars of 2004–2010, when an Iranian role, though not excluded, was “not self-evident” (S002, p. 21), or the cases in which the Houthis acted against Iran’s interests (S041). The “religious war” explanation does not account for shifting alliances across sectarian lines (S042; S001). Judgment: internal factors — political, identity-related and economic — were primary in the outbreak of the war, while external factors decisively determined its scale, duration and current regional character. Confidence: high regarding the multiplicity of causes; moderate regarding the relative weight of the factors, because the sources rarely allow it to be measured.

Why the war continues. The sources point to four sustaining mechanisms: (a) no side has been able to win militarily — seven years of coalition intervention did not take Sanaa from the Houthis (S028; S024; S110), and the government remains fragmented (S088); (b) the conflict provides participants with revenue (S031, p. 26) and legitimacy, and the Houthis build theirs on confrontation with external enemies (S143); (c) according to the UN envoy, treating political, economic and security issues separately can produce only partial, non-lasting results (S171; S135); (d) since 2023, Yemen’s fate has been tied to regional conflicts over which the Yemeni parties have no influence (S135).

6. Internationalization: the Red Sea, the United States and Israel (2023–2025)

6.1. The Red Sea campaign

After the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the start of the Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis began attacking Israeli territory and merchant ships passing through the Bab al-Mandab (S111). On 19 November 2023 they hijacked the ship Galaxy Leader together with its 25-member crew (S031, p. 2; S046, para. 1). According to the UN Panel of Experts, between September 2023 and July 2024 at least 134 attacks on ships were launched from Houthi-controlled areas, including attacks on warships of the United Kingdom and the US (S031, p. 2). The bulk carrier Rubymar, struck on 18 February 2024, sank with a cargo of 22,000 tons of ammonium phosphate (S031, p. 15). In March 2024 three seafarers were killed aboard the True Confidence, and in June 2024 the bulk carrier Tutor was reported to have sunk after being hit, with a fourth seafarer killed on board (S066). In total, from November 2023 to January 2025 the Houthis attacked more than 100 merchant ships, sank two, hijacked one and killed at least four seafarers (S067; S106). ACLED data show the scale and the subsequent slowdown: 150 attacks on ships in 2024 and 7 in 2025 up to 28 November (S133).

The Houthis justified the attacks as solidarity with the Palestinians and as pressure on Israel (S067). In Resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024, the Security Council demanded an end to the attacks and the release of the Galaxy Leader, took note of the right of states to defend their vessels, and required the Secretary-General to submit monthly reports (S046, paras. 1–3, 10). The reporting requirement has been renewed, most recently by Resolution 2826 of 14 July 2026, with China and Russia abstaining (S119). On 19 February 2024 the European Union launched EUNAVFOR Aspides, a purely defensive maritime operation that conducts no strikes on land targets (S045). The United States began a bombing campaign in Yemen in January 2024 (S107); in February 2024 it designated the Houthis a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), and on 5 March 2025 a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) (S036; S090). The rationale of the US executive order of 22 January 2025 cites, among other things, more than 300 projectiles fired toward Israel and more than 100 attacks on ships (S091, section 1). The order also mandated a review of US aid partners in Yemen with regard to payments to Ansar Allah (S091, section 3).

Egypt was hit hard economically. Suez Canal revenues fell from a record USD 9.4 billion in 2023 to USD 3.9 billion in 2024, as the number of ships dropped by 50% and cargo volume by 64.4% (according to the S061 article). In fiscal year 2025/2026 revenues rose, according to the chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, to USD 4.67 billion (S061). In 2025 the president of Egypt estimated the losses at USD 800 million per month (S062). According to ACLED, the number of transits through the Bab al-Mandab in June 2025 was 65% lower than in June 2023 (S133). Different sources give different figures for the decline in traffic because they measure different things (number of ships, tonnage, time periods); in this report such figures are given with the name of the source.

6.2. US Operation Rough Rider and the Oman agreement (2025)

On 15 March 2025 the US launched a campaign intended to compel the Houthis to stop their attacks and to eliminate their capability to threaten shipping (S111). According to an analysis in CTC Sentinel, over 52 days, until 5 May, the US carried out more than 1,100 strikes; it lost two F/A-18 aircraft and at least seven MQ-9 drones, and the cost of the operation was estimated at nearly USD 2 billion (S056). The campaign ended with an agreement announced by Oman: the Houthis stopped attacking US warships and vessels, and the US stopped bombing the Houthis; the agreement did not cover Israel (S056; S058; S107). According to the CRS, the operation degraded but did not eliminate the Houthis’ missile and drone capabilities (S110); the author of the CTC analysis judged that the Houthis had lost neither the capability nor the will to attack shipping (S056).

The operation came at a high cost to the civilian population. A Pentagon review, disclosed in August 2026, found that US strikes in Yemen killed 153 civilians and injured 243 in 2025, all in three attacks in April 2025; the deadliest was the strike on the Ras Isa fuel port on 17 April 2025 (S054; 80 killed and 171 injured, according to the Pentagon, S055). The organization Airwars identified 84 civilians killed at Ras Isa, and Human Rights Watch considered the attack likely disproportionate and called for it to be investigated as a war crime (S054).

6.3. The Israel–Houthi confrontation

The Houthis attacked Israel with missiles and drones; on 19 July 2024 a Houthi drone killed an Israeli citizen and wounded several people in Tel Aviv (S041). Israel responded, among other things, with a strike on the port of Hodeidah on 20 July 2024, which according to the UN Panel of Experts killed at least 9 civilians and injured 83 (S031, p. 35). On 4 May 2025 a Houthi missile struck within the grounds of Ben Gurion Airport, injuring six people; the next day about 20 Israeli aircraft struck the port of Hodeidah and a cement plant near Bajil (S095). Two weeks after the agreement with the US, the Houthis announced a “maritime blockade” of Israel’s Haifa port (S056). According to ACLED, in the first 11 months of 2025 the Houthis carried out 125 strikes on Israeli territory, 120% more than in 2024 (S133). On 28 August 2025 an Israeli airstrike in Sanaa killed the prime minister of the Houthi government and about a dozen senior officials of the movement; in October the Houthis announced the death of their chief of staff, Muhammad al-Ghamari, which Israel attributed to that strike (S098).

In July 2025 the Houthis resumed attacks on ships, sinking the bulk carriers Magic Seas and Eternity C; according to the US Department of State on 8 July, three seafarers were killed (S053), and according to reports of 9 July at least four, with 15 considered missing; the US Mission in Yemen accused the Houthis of abducting many surviving crew members of Eternity C (S067). The last attacks on ships confirmed by the UN mechanism before 2026 involved the vessels Scarlet Ray (31 August 2025) and Minervagracht (29 September 2025) (S048). After the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip in October 2025, the Houthis halted attacks on both shipping and Israel (S107; S111). Analysts at the Washington Institute judged in October 2024, after the first year of the confrontation, that it had strengthened the Houthis — they had become stronger and more technically proficient (S144), and messianic and expansionist currents within the movement gained ground at the expense of pragmatic ones (S143); according to the CRS, however, US strikes degraded their missile and drone capabilities (S110).

6.4. Internal repression and conflict with the UN

At the same time, the Houthis tightened internal control, accusing staff of international organizations of espionage. The detention campaign began on 31 May 2024 (S102); in June 2024, 13 UN staff members and several workers of non-governmental and civil society organizations were detained (S031, p. 37). In early January 2026 at least 69 UN staff members were in detention — all of them Yemeni nationals (S130) — and on 10 June 2026, 73; one had died in detention (S099). The Houthis occupied offices of UN agencies and seized equipment; the UN suspended its activities in Saada governorate (S130). The World Food Programme (WFP) suspended all operations in Houthi-held areas in September 2025 (S139) and terminated the contracts of 365 staff in the north (S121). In November 2025 a Houthi court in Sanaa sentenced 17 people to death for spying for US, Israeli and Saudi intelligence (S103), and on 18 May 2026 — reportedly — 19 people to death for collaborating with the coalition (S108); on 23 August 2026 further detainees, including a UN employee and a UN consultant, were referred to the prosecution service (S102). The Security Council ended the UNMHA mission in Hodeidah effective 31 March 2026, taking into account obstacles to the implementation of its mandate; the latest review of the mission described the security environment as “largely non-permissive,” and detentions of UN personnel had restricted UN operations in Houthi-held areas (S122).

7. 2026: from the crisis in the south to “a new and more dangerous phase”

7.1. The crisis in the south and the breakdown of the Saudi–Emirati alliance (December 2025 – February 2026)

The first crisis of the 2025–2026 period concerned the anti-Houthi camp. In November 2025, a Saudi-backed grouping of tribes from Hadramawt seized the PetroMasila oil facility, which the STC used as a pretext for an offensive in Hadramawt and al-Mahra (S069). In December, STC forces seized oil-rich areas and facilities as well as the presidential palace in Aden, pushing out the Riyadh-aligned National Shield Forces (S068). Saudi Arabia accused the UAE of providing military support to the STC (S111), and the STC announced an independence referendum (S069). At the end of December, Saudi aircraft struck STC positions and equipment stocks linked to deliveries from the UAE, including in the port of Mukalla (S110; S073). The UAE maintained that the shipments did not contain weapons and were destined for Emirati forces (S069). The coalition called on the UAE to withdraw its forces within 24 hours, and the UAE Ministry of Defense announced the end of its mission in Yemen (S069).

In January 2026, STC chairman Aidarous al-Zubaidi was removed from the PLC and charged with high treason; according to the Saudi military, he fled by boat to Somalia and then to Abu Dhabi (S069). On 9 January, the STC secretary-general announced the dissolution of the organization in a statement broadcast on Yemeni television from Saudi Arabia; the announcement was denied by a spokesman based in Abu Dhabi (S068; S069). By 10 January, PLC and Saudi forces had regained control of the areas lost to the STC (S121). On 15 January, Prime Minister Salem bin Breik resigned and was replaced by Foreign Minister Shaya al-Zindani (S074); a second STC-affiliated member, Faraj al-Bahsani, was removed from the PLC (S074; S110). On 6 February, a 34-member government was formed (S121). Saudi Arabia — now the government’s principal sponsor and security partner (S111) — took over the restructuring of the southern forces: it entrusted the security of Aden to the Giants Brigades and to the National Shield Forces that it finances, placed the former “Security Belt” formations under the Ministry of Interior, provided USD 90 million for salaries in the first quarter of 2026, and introduced a biometric census of soldiers (S089).

The crisis left the southern question unresolved. STC supporters protested — in February, during an attempt to storm the al-Maashiq Palace in Aden, security forces reportedly opened fire, killing at least one person, and in April three people were killed in Mukalla (S121; S109). In September 2026, supporters of the dissolved STC blocked — according to residents — the defense minister’s convoy in al-Dhale province (S198). The STC’s foreign affairs representative, Amr al-Bidh, accused Saudi Arabia of failing to keep its promise of a dialogue on the south and of alienating the southern forces that for years had formed the backbone of resistance to the Houthis (S193). As early as December 2025, in an interview for Carnegie (Diwan), Ibrahim Jalal, a former nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center, described the Saudi–Emirati divergences as unprecedented and pointed out that Iran and the Houthis benefit from the new territorial division (S145).

7.2. The war with Iran and the Houthis’ entry (February – June 2026)

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel began strikes on Iran (S201; S048). Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, which forced Saudi Arabia to redirect its oil exports by pipeline to the Red Sea coast and onward through Bab al-Mandab (S201). Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has died — a Houthi delegation traveled to his funeral in July 2026 (S119), and Al Jazeera refers to Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader (S187); Al Jazeera describes him as “slain”; the collected sources give neither the date nor the circumstances of his death. According to ACLED, Iranian retaliatory strikes affected all Gulf states — more than 660 events and at least 41 people killed by early April (S137).

For the first four weeks of the war, the Houthis conducted no armed operations, confining themselves to declarations and preparations. On 5 March, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi stated that the movement stood with Iran and that “our hands are on the trigger” (S208; S137). On 27 March, the Houthis announced their entry into the war, and on 28 March they fired their first missiles at Israel (S137; S106). Crisis Group judged that the delayed entry was a calculated decision taken in coordination with Tehran, held back by fear of losing the May 2025 understanding with the US over the Red Sea and the informal truce with Saudi Arabia of 2022, as well as by economic pressure (S107). The Houthis announced that they would attack US and Israeli targets while avoiding Muslim states; they reportedly mobilized launchers on the coast, prepared sea mines and received advisers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (S137). By May, however, they had not resumed attacks on ships, on US targets or on Arab states (S110; S064).

After the announcement on 7 April of a two-week truce between the US and Iran (S137), the Houthis halted their attacks on Israel (S108). On 10 April, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi announced “active participation” in military operations if escalation against Iran were resumed (S110). On 14 May, the commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), Adm. Brad Cooper, assessed before a Senate committee that Iran was no longer able to reliably arm or supply its proxies, including the Houthis (S108). On the same day, the Yemeni parties agreed under UN auspices to release more than 1,600 conflict-related detainees, which the UN envoy called the largest such release since the war began (S108). On 8 June, the Houthis threatened to resume attacks on Israel-linked ships (S048). In mid-June, the US and Iran concluded a memorandum of understanding (MoU) ending hostilities and providing for the reopening of Hormuz and 60-day negotiations (signed on 17 June, according to SCR) (S172; S048). On 16 June, Grundberg told the Council that the effects of the regional war on Yemen had remained limited and that the calm in place since 2022 was still holding (S169).

The memorandum quickly collapsed: hostilities resumed within a few weeks, the Security Council met in an emergency session on 2 July, and on 17 August the memorandum expired without an agreement; the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed, and the US revoked the sanctions waivers on Iranian oil and on 24 August announced new sanctions (S172). According to UKMTO — the UK center that monitors incidents on maritime routes — ship traffic through Hormuz between March and July 2026 was about 90% lower than before the conflict (S063).

7.3. The Saudi–Houthi confrontation (July – August 2026)

The immediate trigger of the escalation in Yemen was flights from Iran. On 3 July, an aircraft of the Iranian airline Mahan Air landed in Sanaa; according to the Houthis, it brought in patients and picked up a delegation to Ali Khamenei’s funeral; the Yemeni government condemned the flight as a violation of the country’s sovereignty and airspace and accused Iran of using it to transport materials subject to UN sanctions (S119). On 13 July, as another aircraft from Tehran was approaching Sanaa, the airport runway was bombed, and the aircraft landed in Hodeidah (S119; S162). The Yemeni government’s Ministry of Defense claimed the strike, explaining it as necessary to stop the Iranian aircraft (S202); the Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia, declared the end of “the de-escalation phase” and fired missiles at the airport in Abha (S202). Crisis Group attributes the strikes to Saudi Arabia, which regarded the flights as undermining the coalition’s control over Yemeni airspace (S135), while Foreign Affairs attributes them to Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government jointly; according to that article, the aircraft was carrying a Houthi delegation, and the Axios news site reported that Washington had given Riyadh the “green light” for the strike (S154; second-hand report). The authors of the article judged that Iran’s decision to send the flight set off the current escalation (S154).

On 20 July, the Houthis declared “a maritime embargo against the criminal Saudi enemy, based on the equation of ‘an eye for an eye’” (S200), stating that it applied exclusively to the Saudi side (S192). On 22 July, the Houthis said they had attacked the tankers Encelia and Layla; on 24 July, Saudi Arabia struck targets in Hodeidah province and — according to Houthi-affiliated Al Masirah TV — on Kamaran Island; and on 25 July the Houthis said they had hit oil transport sites linked to a Red Sea export hub, and on 26 July they attacked refineries in Jazan and Yanbu (S119; S192; S194). The significance of these attacks stemmed from the fact that, with Hormuz closed, Saudi seaborne oil exports through Bab al-Mandab between March and mid-July 2026 were eight times higher than a year earlier (S077), and more than half of Saudi oil was moving overland to the terminals in Yanbu (S194). According to Foreign Affairs, since the Houthis resumed their attacks in July, Saudi oil exports through Bab al-Mandab have fallen by 95% (S154). On 30 July, Saudi Arabia announced the creation of the Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance to protect shipping in Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The sources differ on the number of participants and the date: SCR refers to Saudi Arabia, Yemen and 12 other states (30 July), The Guardian to a joint statement by 14 states (30 July) and to a 14-country coalition assembled on 14 August, and Crisis Group to more than 40 states, including the US (S119; S194; S193; S135). According to The Guardian, the alliance “has so far been invisible” (S193). On 28 July, Saudi Arabia and the US jointly struck Iran-backed Iraqi militias that had allied themselves with the Houthis (S154). On 7 August, Riyadh concluded a mutual defense pact with Pakistan and Turkey (S135).

Omani mediation at the end of July failed — according to Crisis Group, partly because the Houthis expanded their demands: in addition to salaries, revenues, flights and the port of Hodeidah, they demanded a full Saudi withdrawal from Yemen, an end to the funding of the government and compensation for the intervention (S135). On 6 August, the Houthis struck government force positions in Hadramawt and Marib with missiles and drones; according to Crisis Group’s military sources, at least 50 soldiers were killed, including four Saudi officers (S135), and according to AFP, 58 (S205). On 11 August, Houthi missiles hit a Tanzanian-flagged cargo vessel (according to FDD’s Long War Journal, the Tihamah) near Bab al-Mandab, killing at least six people (S118; S135; S205). In a statement of 7 August, the Security Council condemned the unauthorized landings in Sanaa and Hodeidah and the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and on ships (S162), and on 13 August Grundberg warned that the risk of a return to full-scale war was the highest since 2022 (S160). On 18 August, Crisis Group wrote: “Yemen is quickly sliding back into war” (S135). The government, as Crisis Group noted, saw the escalation as an opportunity to change the balance of power and did not want to return to negotiations; it was using drones more effectively than before, while Saudi Arabia supplied weapons, intelligence and maritime support, leaving the ground fighting to Yemeni forces (S135).

7.4. The coastal offensive and the government’s loss of Bab al-Mandab (September 2026)

On 3–4 September, the Houthis launched a major ground operation in the western part of Taiz province and in Hayis district in Hodeidah province (S136; S190). Crisis Group identified three objectives: demonstrating the ability to operate on multiple fronts simultaneously, seizing the hills overlooking the coast near Mokha and Bab al-Mandab, and pre-empting a possible government offensive on Hodeidah (S136). By 4 September, more than 120 people had been killed (66 government soldiers according to the military, at least 62 fighters according to medical and military sources close to the Houthis) (S184), and according to an AFP tally published by Arab News on 7 September, more than 300 combatants and some civilians (S199). On 6 September, the government announced the recapture of Hayis (S177). On 7 September, a Saudi air strike — according to the Houthis — destroyed a prison in al-Hazm in al-Jawf province; the director of the civil defense agency in al-Jawf later reported 23 killed, and Saudi Arabia did not comment on the matter (S175; S198). On 8 September, the Houthis attacked Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran with missiles and drones, injuring at least 73 people according to the Saudi side and causing fires at energy facilities, including the refinery in Jazan (S077; S118). On the same day, the government announced a counteroffensive on several fronts; Deputy Defense Minister Samir al-Sabri announced the intention to “retake Sanaa” (S176). Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan nevertheless gave assurances that “the road to diplomacy is not closed” (S077).

On 10 September, the Security Council held an emergency meeting convened by Bahrain and the United Kingdom (S118). Grundberg reported that Ansar Allah had taken control of Mokha — a port located about 75 km from Bab al-Mandab — and that the fighting had also spread to Marib, al-Jawf and al-Bayda; according to humanitarian organizations, more than 11,400 households had been displaced since 3 September. He stated that “the question before the international community is no longer whether Yemen’s war will resume, but how to address a new and more dangerous phase” (S115). On 11 September, the Houthis entered — according to a local official and witnesses cited by AFP — Mayun (Perim) Island, which divides the strait into two shipping lanes, after government forces had withdrawn from it (S181; S193), and according to a government military official, they also seized the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands; “Everything that was under our control on the western coast has fallen,” he told AFP (S182). On the same day, Saudi Arabia shut the East–West Pipeline (S156; S193) — according to its statement, “as a precautionary measure,” after an attack by drones that had come from Iraq (S193); Foreign Affairs notes that Iran-backed Iraqi militias have allied themselves with the Houthis (S154). According to The Guardian, oil prices then exceeded USD 100 per barrel (S193). The retreat from Mokha set off mutual recriminations within the government camp, including against the commander of the National Resistance Forces, Tareq Saleh (S193).

On 12–13 September, government forces carried out air strikes on Houthi positions in the Mokha area, and PLC member Sultan al-Arada announced that the forces withdrawn from the coast were regrouping in Marib and would return to the fight, and that the goal remained “the restoration of the capital, Sanaa” (S187). The Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out 129 air strikes within 48 hours and announced an attack on a military base in Sharurah, threatening strikes deeper inside Saudi Arabia (S187). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), by 13 September more than 82,000 people had fled their homes since the beginning of the month (two days earlier, IOM had reported about 46,000 displaced people and more than 500 killed — S193), and more than 2,000 people had reached Djibouti (S187). British diplomatic sources did not expect US President Donald Trump to agree to US strikes on the Houthis despite Saudi requests (S193), and Reuters wrote of his “reported refusal” (S156); the US also maintains a bilateral truce with the Houthis dating from May 2025 (S154). Western capitals feared that even Aden could be under threat (S193). Reuters, citing Yemeni, Iranian and regional sources, reported that Iranian weapons and advice played a critical role in the offensive on Mokha; Tehran denies directly directing Houthi operations (Reuters report cited by S152; the original was not accessible).

The parties’ accounts of the offensive’s results are inconsistent and have not been verified: the Houthis speak of capturing 4,500 square miles and targeting “seven military divisions” of the enemy (S193), while the pro-Iranian newspaper Tehran Times speaks of 5,400 km² (S206). 4,500 square miles is about 11,650 km², so the two figures, which refer to the same offensive, contradict each other. As of 13 September, the active front lines according to Al Jazeera were: the west coast and Bab al-Mandab, Taiz province, Marib and al-Jawf, and al-Dhale (S187).

7.5. The humanitarian and economic situation

The UN humanitarian plan for 2026 assumes that more than 22 million people need assistance, including 5.2 million internally displaced people; 18.3 million people are experiencing acute food insecurity, and more than 2.2 million children under the age of five are acutely malnourished. The plan requires USD 2.16 billion to assist 12 million people (S124). Funding grew slowly: 12.9% in early May (S110), 14% in early June (S108), 19% in July (S111), and “barely 20 per cent” in mid-August (S117). Six million people — the highest number in the world — are in the “Emergency” phase — the fourth of the five phases of the IPC scale — bordering on famine (S117). Between July 2025 and July 2026, more than 200 incidents impeding humanitarian access were recorded (S117). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), from 1 January to 29 March 2026 Yemen reported 3,177 cases of cholera or acute watery diarrhea (S131).

The war with Iran hit a country almost entirely dependent on imports. Fuel imports through Houthi ports in January–May 2026 were 73% lower than a year earlier, and through government ports 60% lower; additional risk fees (about USD 3,000 per 40-foot container) raised the cost of importing into Yemen by as much as 15% (S139). Food prices in Sanaa have risen by 13% since February 2026 (S139). The rial in Aden, which in July 2025 fell to a record 2,905 per dollar (S083), held at around 1,562–1,573 per dollar in the second quarter of 2026 thanks to stabilization and Saudi grants (USD 81.2 million for fuel earlier in 2026, USD 150 million for power plant fuel at the end of May, and about USD 60 million announced on 19 June) (S139). In Houthi-controlled areas, a separate “old” rial is in use, trading at about 531–534 per dollar (S139).

8. The actors and their aims

The tables distinguish declared aims (what a party says publicly) from aims inferred from actions (what sources deduce from its behavior). The latter are judgments made by the sources or by this assessment, not facts.

8.1. Yemeni actors

Actor	Who they are and what they have	Declared aims	Aims inferred from actions (according to sources)	Constraints
Houthis (Ansar Allah)	Leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who stands above the institutions and controls them through a network of supervisors (mushrif) appointed in every ministry and office and holding the decisive say there (S040); forces estimated in 2024 by Yemeni government officials at up to 350,000 fighters (S110); according to CRS (May 2026), weapons with a range of up to 2,150 km (S110); revenue from customs, taxes, telecommunications and fuel (S031, p. 26)	Declared: fighting Israel and the US, ending the “aggression against Gaza” and support for Iran (S067; S208); lifting the “siege” of Yemen (S200)	Converting military control into recognition of de facto sovereignty and into revenue: salaries paid from outside, a share of public revenue, flights from Sanaa, unrestricted operation of the port of Hodeidah (S135); control of the coast and of Bab al-Mandab as leverage (S136; S154); projection of power in the region (S143)	Sanctions pressure (S107) and a persistent economic crisis (S146); losses from drone attacks and airstrikes (S135); according to the government, worsening economic hardship and growing resentment of the Houthis’ coercive security measures (S135); dependence on external technology (S031, p. 2)
Presidential Leadership Council and government	Chairman Rashad al-Alimi, Prime Minister Shaya al-Zindani (S074); financial and military support from Saudi Arabia (S139; S135); international recognition	Restoring state authority over the entire territory and the aim to “retake Sanaa” (S176; S187); implementation of Resolution 2216, which Saudi Arabia calls for (S118)	Using the escalation to change the balance of power instead of returning to negotiations from a position of weakness (S135)	Fragmented command — “eight armies” (S187); no oil revenue and dependence on Riyadh (S139; S111); tensions with the southern forces (S193; S198)
Islah (Yemeni Congregation for Reform)	Sunni Islamist movement with historical ties to the Muslim Brotherhood; main base in Marib — the only gas-producing region (S188)	Unity of Yemen, defense of Marib	Maintaining influence in the army and in Marib; rivalry with the STC (S088)	Distrust from the UAE and the STC (S088)
National Resistance Forces (Tareq Saleh)	West-coast force commanded by the former president’s nephew; member of the PLC (S188); formerly backed by the UAE (S088; S089)	A unified Yemen; a counterweight to both the Houthis and the separatists (S188)	Holding positions on the Red Sea coast	Loss of Mokha in September 2026 and criticism of its commander (S193); unclear place in the Saudi restructuring of forces (S089)
Giants Brigades and National Shield Forces	Giants Brigades under the command of PLC member Abdelrahman al-Muharrami (Abu Zara’a); National Shield Forces trained and funded by Saudi Arabia (S089)	Security of Aden and the south within the new command structure	A pillar of the Saudi restructuring of forces after the crisis with the STC (S089)	Risk that the top-down restructuring alienates the lower ranks (S089)
Southern movement / STC	Formally dissolved in January 2026, which some STC figures dispute (S110; S068); according to STC representative Amr al-Bidh (September 2026), up to 80,000 troops before the dissolution (S193 — claim by a party)	An independent southern state within the pre-1990 borders (S068; S073)	Preserving structures and mobilization capacity despite the dissolution (S110; S198)	Loss of its patron (the UAE) and of its leader (S069; S068); repression of protests (S121; S109)
AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)	About 2,000–3,000 members (estimate cited by CRS, July 2026; S111)	Jihad against the government, the southern forces and the West	According to the UN Panel of Experts — a “covert pragmatic relationship” with the Houthis, an agreed cessation of fighting and coordination of attacks on government forces (S111; S031, p. 2)	Declining activity since 2022 (S086); pressure from counterterrorism forces

8.2. Regional states

Saudi Arabia. Riyadh intervened in 2015 because it regarded control of its southern border by an Iran-allied group as a security threat (S188). Since the 2022 truce, according to Crisis Group, its policy has rested on containing threats from Yemen and creating conditions for a political settlement without lasting military involvement (S135). In 2026 Saudi Arabia is the government’s main sponsor and security partner (S111), funds it (S139) and has restructured the forces in the south (S089). The war with Iran has made the Red Sea the key route for Saudi oil exports (S077; S194), so Riyadh cannot tolerate attacks on shipping and on its territory, while at the same time it does not want a return to open war (S135). Its instruments are air power, funding, and maritime and defense alliances (S135). The foreign minister has given assurances that “the road to diplomacy is not closed” (S077). According to The Guardian, Saudi Arabia faces a dilemma: negotiate with the Houthis or try to push back their forces (S193). Foreign Affairs assesses that the Houthis’ actions have strengthened Riyadh’s determination to confront them rather than induced it to make concessions (S154).

Iran. According to the UN Panel of Experts, the Houthis receive technical assistance, training, weapons and financial support from Iran, Iraqi armed groups and Hezbollah, and the scale of the transfers is “unprecedented”; joint operations centers of the “axis of resistance” with Houthi participation operate in Iraq and Lebanon (S031, p. 2). CRS points to deliveries of components and know-how for building missiles and drones, and to training conducted by the IRGC (S110). Officially, Iran denies controlling the Houthis: Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei calls them “an independent Yemeni actor that makes its own decisions” (S043), and describes the September offensive as the result of Yemenis losing patience after years of a “cruel blockade” (S187). At the same time, the IRGC spokesman called the Houthis’ gains a “divine triumph” (S187). Crisis Group notes that Iran, which previously sought to ease tensions between the Houthis and their opponents, began to see an advantage in disruption in Bab al-Mandab amid its confrontation with the US (S135). According to the Reuters news agency, as cited by NBC, Iran pressed the Houthis to close the strait if the US struck Iranian energy infrastructure (S200). The authors of the Foreign Affairs article assess that Tehran’s long-term goal is Houthi control of Bab al-Mandab alongside Iranian control of Hormuz, and Iranian officials make an agreement with the US conditional on ending “the blockade of Yemen” (S154). A remaining constraint is the weakening of Iran itself — in May 2026 the CENTCOM commander assessed that Iran was not able to supply its allies reliably (S108).

United Arab Emirates. The UAE co-led the coalition (S021), conducted the offensive on Hodeidah in 2018 (S042) and built a network of allies in the south and on the west coast — the STC and Tareq Saleh’s forces (S088). Satellite images from 2021 showed a completed 1,800 m runway on Mayun (Perim) Island (according to Noon Post, S084; S085 confirms an airstrip and hangars built in 2021); according to Long War Journal, citing an AP analysis of satellite imagery, the UAE was “likely” also building an airstrip on Zuqar Island (S085). Following accusations of backing the STC offensive in December 2025 and Saudi strikes, the UAE withdrew its forces from Yemen (S110; S069). The Soufan Center interpreted its policy as part of an effort to expand its influence along the Red Sea (S148). In September 2026 the UAE condemned the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and on ships (S077).

Oman. Oman remains the main channel of contact with the Houthis: it is in Muscat that the UN envoy meets the Houthis’ chief negotiator, Mohamed Abdul Salam (S167), Oman announced the US–Houthi agreement of May 2025 (S056), and in late July 2026 it tried unsuccessfully to restore the Saudi–Houthi truce (S135). In September 2026 Oman is also hosting talks between the Gulf states and Iran on interim rules for shipping through Hormuz (S156).

Israel. Israel has been a target of Houthi attacks since 2023 and has responded with strikes on ports, Sanaa airport and the movement’s leadership, killing the prime minister of the Houthi government and the chief of staff in August 2025 (S095; S098). Defense Minister Israel Katz announced similar action “against any threat in the future” (S098). Israeli INSS analyses could not be downloaded, which limits the picture of the Israeli perspective in this report.

Egypt. Egypt has borne substantial economic costs through lost Suez Canal revenue (S061; S062). It was among the states supporting the Saudi maritime coalition of July 2026 (S194).

Other states. Qatar and Bahrain strongly condemned the September Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia (S077); Bahrain and the United Kingdom called an emergency meeting of the Security Council (S118). Pakistan and Turkey have bound themselves to Saudi Arabia through a defense pact (S135).

8.3. Global powers and the UN

United States. US aims are freedom of navigation, curbing Iranian influence and protecting partners in the Gulf. Washington has designated the Houthis a terrorist organization (S090), imposes sanctions on their financial networks, including those linked to the IRGC (S036), conducted bombing campaigns in 2024–2025 and concluded a mutual non-attack agreement with the Houthis in May 2025 (S056). It backed the closure of the UNMHA mission (S122). In September 2026 Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the Houthis “in many ways agents and representatives of the Iranians” (S043). US policy toward Yemen is, however, ambiguous: according to the news site Axios, Washington gave Riyadh the “green light” to strike Sanaa airport, and on 28 July the US and Saudi Arabia jointly struck pro-Iranian militias in Iraq; at the same time, the US maintains its May 2025 truce with the Houthis (S154). Reuters wrote of President Trump’s “reported refusal” of a Saudi request for strikes on the Houthis (S156; S193), and when asked about the Gulf states’ talks with Iran, the president replied that it was up to them (S156). Analyst Mohammed al-Basha assesses that the US will not join the fighting directly but could support a possible Saudi operation with intelligence, aerial refueling and logistics (S187).

United Kingdom and European Union. The United Kingdom leads on Yemen in the Security Council (S119), took part in the 2024 strikes (S031, p. 35) and, together with France and the US, advocates increasing pressure on the Houthis, including tightening sanctions (S119). The European Union runs the defensive maritime operation Aspides (S045).

Russia. In the Security Council, Russia abstains on resolutions on the Red Sea, avoids attributing blame to the Houthis and warns that greater pressure risks escalation; it called the July flight from Tehran “purely humanitarian” (S119; S047). Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov nevertheless described the September Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia as “counterproductive” (S077). In 2024 The Wall Street Journal, citing anonymous sources, reported on Russian satellite data passed to the Houthis via the IRGC (S037); the authors of the Foreign Affairs article write that Russia also considered supplying advanced weapons but abandoned the idea under pressure from Riyadh (S154). The US Department of the Treasury identified a company acting as an intermediary in payments between the Houthis, Russia and Iran for weapons, including drone engines (S036). The sources collected contain no official Russian declarations of support for the Houthis.

China. China also abstains, opposes the expansion of sanctions and blames military action against Yemen for undermining the peace process (S047; S119); it rejects allegations concerning its arms exports as “groundless” (S171). The UN Panel of Experts recorded weapons with features of Chinese manufacture being offered in Houthi-held areas, as well as an attempt to print counterfeit banknotes at a Chinese printing press (S031, p. 26); the Washington Institute points to dual-use components from China in the Houthi arsenal (S143). In July 2026 Reuters reported direct talks between China and the Houthis on safe passage for Chinese tankers — only the opening of that text was accessible (S153), so the details remain unverified.

UN. Special Envoy Hans Grundberg maintains channels of contact, including the Military Coordination Committee (MCC) involving the government, the Houthis and the coalition command, brokered an agreement in May 2026 to release more than 1,600 detainees, and before the escalation tabled proposals that were not taken up (S160; S115). The Security Council is divided: the United Kingdom, France and the US seek greater pressure on the Houthis and Iran, while China and Russia seek de-escalation without assigning blame (S119). At the same time, the UN is losing its presence on the ground: the UNMHA mission has been closed, and 73 UN staff remain in Houthi detention (S122; S117).

8.4. Are the Houthis an “Iranian proxy”?

The question is disputed among analysts and politicians, and the answer has practical consequences — it determines whether the route to the Houthis runs through pressure on Tehran.

Position	Who	Main argument
The Houthis act as an instrument of Iran	US Secretary of State (S043), government of Yemen (S171)	The Houthis are “in many ways agents and representatives” of Iran (S043); the US representative on the Security Council points to deliveries of weapons, intelligence and logistical support from Iran and others (S170)
Strong dependence and coordination, without full control	UN Panel of Experts (S031), Crisis Group (S107; S135), Foreign Affairs (S154), CRS (S110)	The Houthis could not produce most of their weaponry without external assistance (S031, p. 2); entry into the war in 2026 coordinated with Tehran (S107); Tehran “does not exercise command and control” but has “enormous influence” (S154)
Autonomous ally with convergent aims	Sana’a Center (S040), Brookings (S041), RAND (S042)	Distinct religious identity and own social base; instances of acting against Iran (S041); a relationship based on strategic value rather than doctrine (S042)
Independent actor	Iran (S043; S187)	The Houthi movement “makes its own decisions” (S043)

Judgment. The evidence collected is best described by the formula of an autonomous ally, heavily dependent on Iranian technology and advice, whose actions in 2026 are increasingly coordinated with Iran. The following point to coordination: the timing of the entry into the war (S107), the role of the flights from Tehran in triggering the crisis with Saudi Arabia (S119; S154), Iranian pressure regarding Bab al-Mandab (S200) and reports of IRGC involvement in the offensive on Mokha (S152, second-hand account). The following argue against the full-control model: the movement’s origins and the Saada wars before the period of significant support (S002, p. 21), documented decisions contrary to Iran’s interests (S041), and the fact that the Houthis’ demands on Saudi Arabia are primarily Yemeni — salaries, revenue, ports, the airport (S135). Confidence: moderate. Limiting factor: key information on decisions in Sanaa and Tehran comes from intelligence services and anonymous sources, and both sides of the debate have an interest in a particular narrative. The judgment would change given credible evidence that the Houthis halted or launched a major operation against their own interest on Tehran’s orders — or, conversely, that they refused Iran on a key matter in 2026. The September offensive does not settle this test: its motives may be both regional (coordination with Iran; S107; S152) and domestic — the Houthis are under pressure to pay promised salaries and from deteriorating living conditions in their areas (S154).

9. Why the situation is what it is: key judgments

The judgments below are this assessment’s synthesis based on the sources cited in sections 3–8.

K1. The four-year state of “no war, no peace” collapsed above all because the war with Iran changed the calculus of all parties. The closure of Hormuz made Bab al-Mandab the main route for Saudi oil exports (S077; S194), which gave the Houthis strong leverage over Riyadh and gave Iran an interest in disruption in the Red Sea (S135). The Houthis began using this leverage to convert military control into recognition and revenue (S135). The immediate spark was the dispute over flights from Tehran and the bombing of Sanaa airport in July 2026 (S119; S202), but in this assessment’s judgment it was more a trigger than a cause. The escalation can also be explained primarily by internal pressure on the Houthis — salaries and living conditions (S154) — and by the government’s improved position (K2); the available evidence does not allow the relative weight of these factors to be separated. Confidence: moderate.

K2. The improvement in the government’s position in the first half of 2026 increased rather than reduced the risk of war. After the STC was broken up, Saudi Arabia centralized command and funding of the anti-Houthi forces (S089; S159), and the government began using drones more effectively (S158; S135). The government saw this as an opportunity to change the balance of power (S135), while the Houthis — according to analyst Nadwa al-Dawsari — saw it as a reason to strike before their opponent was ready (S159). Crisis Group, citing sources in Sanaa, points however to other motives for the 6 August strike: an attack on forces tracking arms-smuggling routes and on supply bases near the Saudi border (S135). Confidence: moderate.

K3. The anti-Houthi camp remains structurally weaker than its successes in August and early September suggest. The loss of Mokha, Perim and the islands within two days, mutual recriminations among commanders (S193), fragmented command (S187) and the alienation of the southern forces (S193; S198) indicate that the unification of command was, at the very least, incomplete. Confidence: moderate to low — the course of the fighting is known mainly from accounts by government and military sources, and accounts from the Houthi side are few.

K4. The Houthis currently hold the initiative on the west coast and — according to government sources — control the Yemeni shore of Bab al-Mandab, but they are not able to physically close the strait. Control of Mokha has been confirmed by the UN envoy (S115); the capture of Perim and the Hanish Islands is reported by AFP, The Guardian and Al Jazeera, but their information comes mainly from government officials and witnesses (S181; S182; S193; S187). Crisis Group assesses that the Houthis can raise the risks and costs of shipping but cannot halt it completely (S135) — although, according to Foreign Affairs, Saudi oil exports through the strait have already fallen by 95% (S154). On other fronts (al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib) the situation is unclear, and Al Jazeera assesses that the government’s earlier gains did not amount to a decisive shift (S189). Confidence: high on control of Mokha; moderate on Perim and the islands; low on the balance on the other fronts.

K5. Saudi Arabia faces a difficult choice between escalation and concessions, and uncertainty about US involvement is strengthening the inclination of some Gulf states to talk to Iran. Riyadh does not want a return to the war of 2015–2022 but cannot tolerate a threat to its exports and territory (S135; S193). Sources read its course differently: Crisis Group sees the new alliances as an attempt to raise the costs of escalation rather than preparation for a major campaign (S135), while Foreign Affairs sees a strengthened determination to confront (S154). According to Reuters, the “reported refusal” to carry out US strikes is reinforcing a conviction in some Gulf capitals that talks with Tehran are a necessity (S156), although the US is cooperating with Riyadh against militias in Iraq (S154). Confidence: moderate.

K6. The peace architecture is weaker than at any time since 2018. The UNMHA mission has been closed (S122), the 2023 roadmap remains frozen (S107), the envoy’s proposals, tabled before the escalation, were not taken up (S115), and the Security Council is divided (S119). Confidence: high.

K7. The humanitarian crisis is deepening simultaneously from several directions: the escalation of fighting and displacement (S187), an import shock caused by the war with Iran (S139), low aid funding (S117), and the WFP’s withdrawal from the north and detentions of UN staff (S139; S099). Confidence: high.

10. Forecasts from different perspectives and this assessment’s scenarios

10.1. How the parties to the conflict see the future

Party	How it presents the situation and the further course of events
Houthis	The operation “Allah Is Stronger in Might and More Severe in Punishment” is the “liberation” of districts on the western coast (S210); spokesman Yahya Saree threatens increasingly powerful attacks deep inside Saudi Arabia if the airstrikes continue (S187); the Houthis say they will lift the blockade once Saudi Arabia lifts its blockade of Yemen (S194)
Yemeni government	The war continues until state institutions and authority over the entire territory are restored (S077); PLC member Sultan al-Arada: the withdrawn forces “will return to the battle,” and the goal remains Sanaa (S187); the government speaks of a “battle for survival” (S187)
Saudi Arabia	Firm defense, but “the road to diplomacy is not closed” (S077); Saudi analyst Khaled Batarfi: retaliation, but not a prolonged war — “not with Iran, and not with the Houthis” (S077)
Iran	The Houthis make their decisions independently of Tehran, and current events are the result of “the Yemenis losing patience”; Tehran calls for an end to the Saudi “siege” of Houthi-held areas and for a return to talks between the Houthis and Riyadh (S187); the Houthi gains are a “divine triumph” (IRGC, S187)
United States	Rubio: “the hand of Iran” is behind the escalation (S043); at the same time, the reported refusal to approve US strikes and distance from the Gulf states’ talks with Iran (S156)
Russia and China	Restraint and calls for moderation, without assigning blame; the need to de-escalate the wider US–Iran conflict and tensions in the Gulf (S119); Russia did, however, call the September Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia “counterproductive” (S077)
UN	A “new and more dangerous phase” of the war; priorities: open channels of communication, respect for humanitarian law, preservation of the political track (S115)
Southerners (former STC)	Amr al-Bidh: a comprehensive national, regional and international strategy is needed, and occasional airstrikes are not enough; broken Saudi promises have left southerners unwilling to fight in the north; the Houthi presence in the strait will give them new revenue from ports (S193)
Expert voice in Polish media	Volker Perthes in Rzeczpospolita: there is a risk that Bab al-Mandab will be effectively closed to shipping, especially to large tankers, because Iran, if it cannot fully control Hormuz, will want to demonstrate its ability to disrupt shipping through the Houthis (S214)

10.2. How research institutions assess the future

• International Crisis Group (18 August and 8 September 2026): the most likely scenario in the short term is one of limited exchanges of fire using missiles, drones and artillery, together with intense fighting on several fronts; a transition to all-out war could come about through a series of small, seemingly defensive decisions; lasting de-escalation is hardly realistic without a resolution of the US–Iran confrontation; the September battle could turn into a protracted confrontation with new fronts (S135; S136).
• Foreign Affairs (April Longley Alley and Allison Minor, 11 September 2026): two forks in the road — either Saudi Arabia mobilizes international support for a major campaign, or the Saudis “capitulate” to the Houthis after their gains, which could strengthen Houthi regional ambitions; Yemen could become an arena of great-power rivalry around a strategic strait (S154).
• Reuters (13 September 2026): Fawaz Gerges calls the capture of the islands a “game changer” that alters the balance of power; Alex Vatanka (Middle East Institute) — the Gulf states may be forced to reach an understanding with Iran on their own, because “America can’t get them out of this quagmire” (S156).
• Mohammed al-Basha (Basha Report, 13 September 2026): neither side will collapse quickly; a protracted conflict similar to the one in Sudan, eventually ending in forced negotiations (S187).
• Hisham al-Omeisy (European Institute of Peace, 8 September 2026): in Yemen’s history an agreement is always reached; there will be no winner who takes all, and an assault on Sanaa would be a “bloodbath” (S077).
• Sultan Barakat (opinion piece in Al Jazeera, 13 September 2026): the escalation could turn against Iran, drawing Saudi Arabia and Egypt closer to the US and creating informal coordination with Israel, but at the cost of further internationalization of the war (S157).
• Atlantic Council (Allison Minor, 10 March 2026): of the Houthis’ three options, the most serious — attacks on Saudi Arabia combined with attacks in the Red Sea and ground offensives — could “reignite” the war in Yemen (S146). Elements of this scenario — attacks on Saudi Arabia and a ground offensive — have occurred since July 2026.
• Council on Foreign Relations (survey of November 2025) assessed the conflict in Yemen as a threat of moderate likelihood and moderate impact for US interests (S147); Soufan Center (January 2026) anticipated further division of Yemen as a result of rivalry in the south (S148).

Note on forecast accuracy. Assessments from the turn of 2025 and 2026 — as well as the UN Special Envoy’s briefing of 16 June 2026, which spoke of limited effects of the regional war on Yemen (S169) — did not anticipate the pace of escalation in the summer of 2026. This points to considerable uncertainty in all current forecasts, including those below.

10.3. This assessment’s scenarios for 12 months (to 30 September 2027)

The scenarios below are the judgment of this assessment. They are resolved on 30 September 2027 in the order given: if the criterion for D has been met, D is the outcome; if not, C is checked, then B; in all other cases, A is the outcome. This order makes the scenarios mutually exclusive, and their probabilities sum to 100%. Resolution sources: reports by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Special Envoy, notices from UKMTO and JMIC (the Joint Maritime Information Center), and reports by at least two independent news agencies (AP, AFP, Reuters). A value lying on the boundary between two ranges of the scale is assigned to the higher range.

Scenario (resolution order)	Definition — resolution criterion	Probability	What would have to happen
D. Military breakthrough	At any time up to 30 Sep 2027, the Houthis take control of the city of Aden or the city of Marib, or government forces take control of Sanaa	about 10% — very unlikely	A collapse in the cohesion of one of the sides, e.g., disintegration of the government camp in the south or an internal Houthi crisis
C. Regional war in Yemen	D not met, and in any period of four consecutive weeks up to 30 Sep 2027: (a) airstrikes by Saudi Arabia, the US or Israel on targets in Yemen, publicly confirmed by the attacking state, on at least 20 of 28 days, or (b) Houthi attacks after which UKMTO or JMIC maintain the highest threat level (SEVERE or CRITICAL, respectively) for Bab al-Mandab	about 25% — unlikely	A major Houthi attack causing many casualties in Saudi Arabia, the sinking of a tanker, an attack on a US warship, or a decision by Riyadh to launch a full campaign
B. New freeze	Neither D nor C met; on 30 Sep 2027 a publicly announced agreement on a ceasefire or de-escalation is in force, either between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia or nationwide (with the participation of the UN or Oman), and no cross-border attacks were recorded in the preceding 30 days	about 25% — unlikely	A US–Iran agreement opening Hormuz or an arrangement between the Gulf states and Iran; economic concessions to the Houthis (salaries, airport, ports)
A. Protracted limited war	None of D, C or B met — including, among other things, fighting on some of the fronts or periodic cross-border attacks without an agreement in force	about 40% — unlikely; the most likely of the four scenarios	The US–Iran confrontation continues without resolution; Saudi Arabia supports the government from the air but avoids a full campaign

Basis. Seven years of coalition intervention (2015–2022) did not bring about a change in control of Sanaa (S028; S024; S110), and Marib did not fall despite earlier Houthi offensives (S088; S142), which argues against scenario D. Since 2022 Saudi Arabia has avoided open war, and the US — according to reports — does not want to strike the Houthis (S135; S156), which lowers C; C is raised, however, by the scale of the current airstrikes, the 95% drop in Saudi exports through the strait, and US cooperation with Riyadh against militias in Iraq (S187; S154). Arguing against a quick freeze (B) are the Houthis’ expanded demands, the government’s conflicting goals, and the linkage of Yemen to the unresolved US–Iran war (S135); arguing for it is the fact that earlier rounds of this war ended in negotiated truces — in 2022 under UN mediation (S023) and in 2025 through Oman (S056). Confidence in this judgment: low — the situation is highly fluid, and key decisions (by Tehran, Riyadh and Washington) are difficult to predict.

Specific forecasts (horizon and resolution criterion in parentheses):

1. The Houthis still control Sanaa (30 Sep 2027) — very likely, about 90%. Confidence: moderate.
2. The Houthis capture the city of Marib or Aden (at any time up to 30 Sep 2027) — very unlikely, no more than about 10% (the event falls within scenario D). Confidence: low; concerns in Western capitals about Aden (S193) indicate that the risk is not negligible.
3. An announced ceasefire between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, or a nationwide ceasefire, takes effect (up to 31 Mar 2027) — unlikely, about 30%. Confidence: low.
4. US forces carry out strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen (up to 31 Mar 2027) — unlikely, about 30%. Confidence: low; the main trigger is a Houthi attack on US shipping, which the Houthis have so far avoided (S193).

Indicators to watch:

• the course of US–Iran talks and of talks between the Gulf states and Iran on Hormuz (e.g., the meeting in Oman announced for 14 September 2026) (S156; S193);
• the scale and persistence of Saudi airstrikes and any change in the US position (S187; S156);
• Houthi attacks on ships unconnected to Saudi Arabia and on Western warships (S193);
• the situation on the Marib, Taiz and al-Dhale fronts, and especially in the Aden area (S187);
• the cohesion of the government camp: the fate of Tareq Saleh, the position of the southern forces and of former STC activists (S193; S198);
• new flights or deliveries from Iran and reports of IRGC advisers (S119; S152);
• mediation activity by the UN Special Envoy, including use of the Military Coordination Committee (S115), and by Oman (S135);
• the state of the East–West Pipeline and of exports via Yanbu (S193);
• humanitarian aid funding and access to Houthi-controlled areas (S117).

Three-to-five-year outlook (conditional, without probabilities). If there is no decisive military outcome, the development most consistent with the sources is a lasting de facto partition: the Houthis in the northwest with a growing regional role, and a fragmented government-held area dependent on Saudi Arabia. Ibrahim Jalal, in an interview for Carnegie, pointed out that disintegration could lead to the emergence of more than two entities (S145). A political settlement would require — according to Crisis Group — not only confidence-building measures but also a resolution of power-sharing, the status of the south, the system of government and the unification of the financial system (S135). A lasting settlement of the US–Iran confrontation appears to be a necessary condition (S135).

11. What is not known

• The actual balance of forces and losses. Data on the course of the fighting come mainly from the parties. Only partial casualty tallies exist for 2026: AFP (based on sources from both sides), WHO (for selected periods and provinces) and IOM (according to The Guardian, more than 500 killed up to 11 September); they cover different periods and definitions and are not comparable with the UNDP model.
• The degree of Iran’s control over Houthi decisions (section 8.4) — key evidence is classified or anonymous.
• Houthi cohesion and economy. Sanctions pressure and a decline in imports are known (S139), but there are no reliable data on the movement’s finances or on public sentiment in the areas it controls.
• Decisions in Riyadh and Washington. Reports of Saudi offensive plans (S194) and of a US refusal (S156) are based on anonymous sources.
• The real strength of the former STC and the readiness of the southern forces to fight the Houthis (S193 — claims by a party).
• The latest hunger data. The current 2026 IPC analysis could not be downloaded; the figures cited come from the UN humanitarian plan, statements by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Sana’a Center.
• Israeli perspectives, Polish institutional perspectives and some Western analyses (INSS, Chatham House, PISM, OSW) are not represented, because the sources were inaccessible or were not found in the search.
• Events after 13 September 2026 are not taken into account; at the current pace of change, findings on the present situation will require updating within weeks.

12. Method and review

12.1. How the work was done

1. Framework. The question, scope, definitions, sub-questions and competing hypotheses were set out before research began.
2. Source discovery. Eight AI discovery agents each searched the web on one thematic area: background history; the 2015–2023 war; Iran and arms supplies; the Red Sea; the anti-Houthi camp and the south; Israel and the regional wars; the humanitarian situation and the UN; forecasts. Wikipedia pages were used only for orientation and are not cited.
3. Retrieval. 214 sources were registered; 182 were downloaded and stored with a SHA-256 checksum, and 32 could not be retrieved (publisher blocks, missing pages, legal restrictions). Some UN pages and news-agency dispatches were obtained from the Wayback Machine archive. Sources that were not retrieved are not cited as read.
4. Reading and claims register. Quotations were extracted from the stored files with a locator (page, paragraph or heading). Claims material to the conclusions were recorded in a register with their type (fact, attributed statement, judgment, forecast), source, locator, status and confidence.
5. Verification. An AI checking agent checked 63 of 127 factual claims against the stored copies. When the Polish original was translated into English and German, the translation agents re-opened every quoted source; this surfaced 42 discrepancies between the wording and the sources — among them dropped qualifiers such as “reportedly”, statements attributed to the wrong speaker, the date of Hadi’s house arrest and two wrong page numbers — which were corrected in all editions. Before publication, ten AI checking agents checked every sentence with a source reference — about 530 clauses and chronology rows — against the stored sources; this led to 44 further corrections, each verified against the source (among them the swapped dates of the Houthis’ agreements with the US and with Saudi Arabia, an unsupported claim that Egypt bore the largest costs, and statements attributed to the wrong party). None of the corrections changed the key judgments, scenarios or forecasts.
6. Review. An AI editorial agent read the full draft as a critical expert; its objections were checked against the sources and addressed. The publisher approved this edition on 15 September 2026. No independent human fact-check, translator review or specialist review (for example by a Yemen specialist) has taken place.

12.2. Limitations

• The report was prepared with an AI assistant; it has not undergone independent human or expert review (e.g., by a regional specialist on Yemen).
• Information on the course of the fighting in 2026 comes largely from the parties to the conflict; where news outlets could not verify it, this is indicated in the text.
• Some sources have a distinct political perspective: the Saba agency in Sanaa (Houthi), Tehran Times (pro-government, Iranian), Noon Post (sympathetic to Qatar), Foundation for Defense of Democracies (hawkish, American), Iran International (opposed to Iran’s authorities). They were cited as voices of the parties or with a caveat.
• Access is lacking to some analyses (Chatham House, INSS, original Reuters dispatches, the current IPC analysis) and to Polish institutional analyses.
• Figures given by different sources (casualties, number of attacks, decline in shipping traffic, members of the maritime coalition) often differ; they are given with the name of the source and the date.
• The English and German editions are AI-assisted translations that have not been checked by a translator or a native speaker. The working records of the case (brief, analysis, verification, review) remain in Polish; the source and claims registers are in English.
• This edition was translated from the Polish original with AI assistance and has not been checked by a translator or a native speaker.

12.3. Use of AI

Research, drafting, translation and checking were carried out with an AI assistant (Claude Code) and supporting agents. All conclusions and forecasts are judgments prepared with AI assistance and have not been approved by a subject-matter expert. The measured AI usage behind this edition is stated with the article.

Annex A. Chronology

Date	Event	Source
893	First Zaydi state in Yemen	S003, p. 95
26 Sep 1962	Revolution ends the imamate; 1962–1970 civil war with Egyptian and Saudi involvement	S005; S212
22 May 1990	Unification of Yemen	S015
May 1994	Short civil war; southern secession suppressed	S003; S088
17 Jan 2002	First collective chanting of the Houthi movement’s slogan in the Marran mountains	S003, p. 149
Jun–Sep 2004	First Saada war; Hussein al-Houthi killed on 10 Sep 2004	S002, p. 7; S003, p. 163
2 Feb 2008	Doha agreement (Qatari mediation), soon broken	S002, p. 8
Aug 2009 – Feb 2010	Sixth Saada war; Saudi Arabia involved from Nov 2009	S003, p. 163, 185–186; S014
2011	Uprising against Saleh; Houthis take power in Saada	S001
23 Nov 2011	GCC initiative: Saleh transfers his powers to Hadi	S006
Mar 2013 – Jan 2014	National Dialogue Conference	S005, p. 225
10 Feb 2014	A committee approves the division into six regions	S012, p. 5
21 Sep 2014	Houthis in Sanaa; Peace and National Partnership Agreement	S008
17 Jan 2015	Houthis abduct the president’s office director in a dispute over the constitution	S013
26 Mar 2015	Start of the Saudi-led coalition intervention	S028
14 Apr 2015	UN Security Council Resolution 2216	S011
4 Dec 2017	Houthis kill Ali Abdullah Saleh	S042
Jun 2018	UAE-led offensive on Hodeidah	S042
13 Dec 2018	Stockholm Agreement	S017
14 Sep 2019	Attack on Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais	S029
2019	Riyadh Agreement between the government and the STC (talks 20 Aug – 24 Oct 2019)	S019
2 Apr 2022	UN truce	S023
7 Apr 2022	Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) established	S026
2 Oct 2022	Formal end of the truce; relative calm continues	S024; S160
14 Sep 2023	Houthi delegation in Riyadh	S028
19 Nov 2023	Houthis hijack the vessel Galaxy Leader	S031; S046
23 Dec 2023	UN announces the parties’ commitments to a roadmap	S022
10 Jan 2024	UN Security Council Resolution 2722 on attacks in the Red Sea	S046
19 Feb 2024	European Union launches Operation Aspides	S045
31 May 2024	Start of a campaign of detentions of UN and non-governmental organization staff	S102
22 Jul 2024	Agreement ending the banking war	S082
5 Mar 2025	United States designates the Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization	S090
15 Mar – 5 May 2025	US Operation “Rough Rider”; US–Houthi agreement brokered by Oman	S056; S058
Jul 2025	Sinking of the vessels Magic Seas and Eternity C	S053; S067
28 Aug 2025	Israeli airstrike in Sanaa kills the Houthi government’s prime minister and chief of staff	S098
Oct 2025	Gaza Strip ceasefire; Houthis halt attacks	S107; S111
Dec 2025	STC offensive in Hadramawt and al-Mahra; Saudi strikes; UAE withdrawal	S068; S069; S110
9–16 Jan 2026	Dissolution of the STC announced; changes in the PLC and the government	S068; S074
28 Feb 2026	Start of the US and Israeli war with Iran	S201; S048
28 Mar 2026	Houthis enter the war with an attack on Israel	S106; S137
31 Mar 2026	End of the UN mission UNMHA	S122
7 Apr 2026	Two-week US–Iran truce; Houthis halt attacks	S108; S109
14 May 2026	Agreement on the release of more than 1,600 detainees	S108
mid-Jun 2026	US–Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU), which expired on 17 Aug 2026 without an agreement	S172; S048
3 and 13 Jul 2026	Flights from Tehran to Sanaa; bombing of Sanaa airport; Houthis announce the end of de-escalation	S119; S202
20 Jul 2026	Houthis announce a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia	S200
30 Jul 2026	Saudi Arabia announces the Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance	S119; S135
6 Aug 2026	Deadly Houthi attacks on government forces in Hadramawt and Marib	S135
3–4 Sep 2026	Houthi offensive on the west coast and in Taiz	S136; S190
8 Sep 2026	Houthi attacks on southern Saudi Arabia; government counteroffensive	S077; S176
10 Sep 2026	Houthis seize Mokha; emergency UN Security Council meeting	S115; S178
11 Sep 2026	Houthis seize Perim (Mayun) Island and the Hanish Islands; Saudi Arabia shuts the East–West Pipeline	S181; S182; S193
12–13 Sep 2026	Saudi and government airstrikes; more than 82,000 displaced since the beginning of September	S187

Sources

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• S084 · english.noonpost.com — Islands, Bases, and Ports: What the UAE Lost in Yemen in Just One Week — Noon Post (2026-01)
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• S095 · www.timesofisrael.com — 20 Israeli fighter jets strike in Yemen after Houthi missile hits Ben Gurion Airport — Times of Israel (2025-05)
• S098 · www.timesofisrael.com — Houthi military chief dies, group says, and Israel claims responsibility — Times of Israel (2025-10-16)
• S099 · press.un.org — Condemning Continued Arbitrary Detentions of UN, Other Personnel in Yemen, Secretary-General Calls for Their Immediate, Unconditional Release — UN Secretary-General (2026)
• S102 · www.hrw.org — Houthis Prosecute UN, Civil Society Staff in Yemen — Human Rights Watch (2026-08-25)
• S103 · www.aljazeera.com — Houthi court sentences 17 to death accused of spying for Israel West — Al Jazeera (2025-11-23)
• S106 · www.pbs.org — Yemen’s Houthis claim first missile attack on Israel since war began — PBS NewsHour (AP) (2026-03-28)
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• S118 · www.securitycouncilreport.org — Yemen: Emergency Briefing (September 2026) — Security Council Report (2026-09)
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• S130 · www.hrw.org — Houthi Detentions Halting Aid in Crisis-Hit Yemen — Human Rights Watch (2026-01-08)
• S131 · cdn.who.int — Multi-country outbreak of cholera - Epidemiological Update 36 — WHO (2026-04-30)
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• S144 · www.washingtoninstitute.org — A Draw Is a Win: The Houthis After One Year of War — The Washington Institute (not known)
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• S152 · www.iranintl.com — Russia may fill Iran gap if support for Yemen Houthis falters — Iran International (2026-09)
• S153 · chinaglobalsouth.com — China in Touch With Yemen’s Houthis to Allow Ships to Sail Through Red Sea — China Global South Project (2026-07-29)
• S154 · www.foreignaffairs.com — Iran’s Second Front — Foreign Affairs (2026)
• S156 · www.al-monitor.com — Analysis-Houthis’ Yemen advance leaves Gulf states with uncomfortable choice — Al-Monitor (Reuters) (2026-09)
• S157 · www.aljazeera.com — The Houthis’ escalation in Yemen could flop — Al Jazeera (Opinion) (2026-09-13)
• S158 · www.aljazeera.com — The next Yemen war might be different — Al Jazeera (2026-08-15)
• S159 · www.aljazeera.com — Will all-out war in Yemen reignite as the Houthis escalate attacks? — Al Jazeera (2026-08-13)
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• S175 · apnews.com — Houthis accuse Saudi Arabia of a strike on a prison in northern Yemen, killing 7, including a child — Associated Press (2026-09-07)
• S176 · www.aljazeera.com — Yemeni forces launch counteroffensive against Houthis, vow to retake Sanaa — Al Jazeera (2026-09-08)
• S177 · www.aljazeera.com — Yemeni forces claim strategic district amid intensified Houthi clashes — Al Jazeera (2026-09-06)
• S178 · today.lorientlejour.com — Houthis seize Mokha city on Red Sea: Yemen military source — L’Orient Today (AFP) (2026-09-10)
• S181 · web.archive.org — Houthis seize key Red Sea island, complete takeover of Bab el-Mandeb area, says official (Wayback copy) — AFP via The Times of Israel (2026-09-11)
• S182 · web.archive.org — Houthis seize last two Bab al-Mandab islands — Yemen military official (Wayback copy) — AFP via The Times of Israel (2026-09-11)
• S184 · web.archive.org — Over 120 killed in deadly Yemen clashes as Houthis push toward key strait (Wayback copy) — AFP via The Times of Israel (2026-09-04)
• S187 · www.aljazeera.com — Fighting continues between Yemen govt forces, Houthis: What is the latest? — Al Jazeera (2026-09-13)
• S188 · www.aljazeera.com — Yemen war escalates: Who are the key actors involved? — Al Jazeera (2026-09-09)
• S189 · www.aljazeera.com — How significant are the Yemeni government’s military gains against Houthis? — Al Jazeera (2026-09-06)
• S190 · www.aljazeera.com — Houthi fighters clash with Yemeni government forces in country’s southwest — Al Jazeera (2026-09-03)
• S192 · www.aljazeera.com — Saudi Arabia strikes Houthi-held Hodeidah, Yemeni group says — Al Jazeera (2026-07-24)
• S193 · www.theguardian.com — Iran’s Houthi allies capture strategic island on vital oil shipping route — The Guardian (Patrick Wintour) (2026-09-11)
• S194 · www.theguardian.com — Saudi Arabia prepares sea and possible land offensive against Houthis — The Guardian (Patrick Wintour) (2026-07-30)
• S198 · apnews.com — Death toll in Yemen prison airstrike rises to 23 with 7 still missing, Houthis say — Associated Press (Samy Magdy) (2026-09-09)
• S199 · www.arabnews.com — Toll from Yemen clashes passes 300 as civilians flee homes — Arab News (2026-09-07)
• S200 · www.nbcnews.com — Yemen’s Houthis declare naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, widening threat to global oil supplies — NBC News (2026-07-20)
• S201 · www.bbc.com — Iran-backed Houthis join war with attack against Israel — BBC News (2026-03-28)
• S202 · www.bbc.com — Yemen’s Houthis launch missiles at Saudi Arabia after strikes on Sanaa airport — BBC News (2026-07-14)
• S205 · www.longwarjournal.org — Fighting in Yemen escalates, raising concern of a return to civil war — FDD’s Long War Journal (Bridget Toomey) (2026-08-12)
• S206 · www.tehrantimes.com — Ansarallah widens Yemen’s western-coast gains despite Saudi airstrikes — Tehran Times (Iranian state-aligned) (2026-09-13)
• S208 · www.middleeastmonitor.com — Houthi leader declares support for Iran and warns group ready to act — Middle East Monitor (2026-03-06)
• S210 · www.saba.ye — War Media releases initial footage of operation (Houthi agency) — SabaNet (Houthi-run Yemen News Agency) (2026-09)
• S212 · adst.org — The Proxy of My Proxy: Saudi Arabia vs. Egypt in North Yemen — Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training (oral histories of US diplomats) (2015-07)
• S213 · www.historytoday.com — Yemen’s Endless Wars — History Today (not known)
• S214 · www.rp.pl — Jemen: Nowa broń Iranu na USA. Ekspert: Ryzyko, że cieśnina Bab al Mandab zostanie zamknięta — Rzeczpospolita (2026-09)